Why Nigeria Should Also Think of Itself as a Central African State
This article was first published on 'African Arguments Online' on 21 July 2015
President Muhammadu Buhari with the President of Chad,
Idris Deby, during a Press Conference at the State House in N’djamena, Chad. 4 June
2015. Photo Credit: frontiersnews.com |
The ‘concentric
circle‘ model which frames how Nigeria’s foreign policy thinkers view our
region places the country exclusively in West Africa. Consequently West Africa
has traditionally been the main focus of the country’s regional diplomacy.
West Africa also remains the arena of Nigeria’s boldest and
most celebrated diplomatic initiatives to date – the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 and the ECOMOG
interventions of the 1990s.
I think this view of our broader region which situates
Nigeria on the eastern edges of West Africa is incomplete. Instead our
strategic thinkers should embrace the country’s natural identity as a potential
pivotal power situated at a crossroad between multiple regions, and an anchor
state linking West and Central Africa together.
Nigeria’s broader region also encompasses Central Africa.
Therefore we should also join Central Africa’s principal regional organisation
– the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – as an observer.
A Potential Pivotal Power and an Anchor State
Geographically, Nigeria shares land and sea boundaries with
six countries: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, and Sao Tome
and Principe. Of these, only Benin and Niger are West African states and
members of ECOWAS. Our other four neighbours are Central African states and
members of ECCAS. Our longest land boundary is with a Central African and ECCAS
state: Cameroon.
Similarly, Nigeria’s most pressing security challenge – Boko
Haram’s terrorist insurgency – is concentrated along our borders with our
Central African neighbours, Cameroon and Chad. To all intents and purposes,
given the serious security threat posed by Boko Haram, Nigeria’s defence
diplomacy will be oriented towards our Central African border for the next few
years.
Central Africa has a special place in Nigeria’s diplomatic
and military history. Independent Nigeria’s first troop deployment abroad was
to the Democratic Republic of Congo. A month after gaining independence,
Nigeria volunteered
an army contingent to join UN forces trying to quell the post-independence
crisis that gripped that Central African country.
Similarly Nigeria’s first major military intervention abroad
under its own initiative occurred in one of our Central African neighbours:
Chad. Alarmed at the chaos on its north-eastern border as a result of Chad’s
civil war, Nigeria deployed
an 800-man peacekeeping force into the country in March 1979.
Its objective was to maintain order and provide breathing
room for the rebels to hammer out a political settlement to the conflict. The
mission failed. Nigeria, lacking
the “political, economic and military leverage needed to impose peace on the
factions in Chad”, withdrew its troops three months later.
Undeterred Nigeria again deployed troops in December 1981,
but this time as part of a wider Nigerian-led multilateral effort under the
auspices of the Organisation of African Unity. The initiative was driven from
Lagos, the force was commanded by a Nigerian, and Nigeria provided the bulk of
the troops, 2000 out of 3500.
This was Nigeria’s largest force deployment abroad, until
the ECOMOG operations in West Africa of the 1990s. Hampered by acute logistical
weaknesses and financial difficulties – and after Hissène Habré, backed by
France and the US, seized power in June 1982 – Nigeria and the OAU force
withdrew.
A year later Nigeria again resorted to military force – this
time unilaterally – to dislodge occupying Chadian forces from a disputed Island
in Lake Chad and protect Nigerian fishermen from the spill-over of Chad’s
raging civil war. This sparked a three month-long crisis and intermittent
border clashes from April-July 1983, killing an “estimated
seventy-five Chadian soldiers and nine Nigerians”, until an agreement was
signed on 11 July resolving the crisis.
Unfortunately these important interventions – especially the
abortive peacekeeping attempts in March 1979 and December 1981-June 1982 – and
the rich lessons that can be gleaned from them are largely absent from public
discourse, due to the West Africa-centric prism through which we view Nigeria’s
regional environment.
Economic, Historical and Cultural Ties
Nigeria’s economic linkages further reinforce the point that
the country is as much a Central African as it is a West African country.
UNCTAD’s recent report on intra-African trade show that all thirteen countries
that count Nigeria as among their top five export partners are West and Central
African states (pg. 22-27).
Five of these – CAR, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Sao
Tome and Principe – are Central African and ECCAS countries. Similarly, of the
eleven countries that count Nigeria as among their top five import partners,
three – Cameroon, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea – are in Central Africa and
ECCAS.
Nigeria’s own trade with the two regions however is heavily
West Africa-centric. This is because West Africa is generally more developed than
Central Africa, and because of the decades-long foreign and trade policy focus
on West Africa.
The historical and cultural bonds between parts of Nigeria
and some Central African states complete the linkages binding our country to
the fate of its ECCAS neighbours. Fulanis make up about 9% of Nigeria’s
population and about 10% of Cameroon’s. Kanuris constitute about 4% of
Nigeria’s population and about 9% of Chad’s.
The Sokoto Caliphate, which sprouted from modern day
north-western Nigeria in the early 19th century and grew to become the most
powerful state in West Africa, at its height stretched eastwards covering
virtually all of northern Cameroon, and small parts of Chad and the Central
African Republic. Similarly the Kanem-Borno Empire, which originated in modern
day north-eastern Nigeria in the 9th century, at its furthest extent in the
14th century encompassed almost all of Chad, northern Cameroon and small parts
of the Central African Republic.
With African integration seemingly gathering pace – the
agreement to establish the Tripartite Free Trade
Area between the 26 member states of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, was signed on
June 10 in Cairo, and the deadline
for establishing a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) has been set for 2017 –
joining ECCAS will leave Nigeria best placed to take the lead and advocate for
harmonizing the integration agendas of West and Central Africa in preparation
for the establishment of the CFTA.
In sum, joining ECCAS will broaden Nigeria’s strategic
horizon and give our foreign policy planners a more accurate perspective of our
regional location. It will also incentivise Nigeria to participate in shaping
the economic and security environment of a long neglected part of our wider
neighbourhood: Central Africa.
Discarding the old paradigm that sees Nigeria as lodged on
the eastern edges of West Africa, and instead embracing the country’s natural
identity as a pivotal power, an anchor state, a geostrategic gateway, and a
connecting node linking West and Central Africa will widen our regional
opportunities. It will also enrich our economic and cultural diplomacy.
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