From ‘Elusive Friendship’ to Realistic Partnership (Part I)
Opportunities and Limits of a Nigeria-Russia Rapprochement
 |
| President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Vladimir Putin
signing the “Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership”
between Nigeria and Russia, March 6 2001 (Kremlin.ru) |
20 May 1974, General Yakubu Gowon departed Lagos for an 8-day State
visit to the Soviet Union. The first ever such visit by a Nigerian Head of
State. It was a symbolic gesture of gratitude to the Soviet Union for
helping the Federal Government win the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). It was
also meant to open a new chapter in bilateral relations between the two
countries. A state of “high alert”[1]
and ideological suspicion had characterised the relationship before the Civil
War[2].
There were high hopes at the time that, guided by pragmatism and mutual interests, cooperation would now deepen. Despite this optimism
however, bilateral ties never moved beyond what Maxim Matusevich, a scholar on
Nigeria-Russia relations, describes as an “elusive friendship … forever
fluctuating between protracted periods of stagnation and an occasional
declaration of friendship”[3].
Nigeria’s recent
difficulties in procuring weapons from the United States to better combat
Boko Haram has seen it turn once more to Russia for help; a move
reminiscent of the Civil War days when the Soviet Union armed Nigeria following equivocations from its western partners. Russia, keen to expand
its influence in Africa and find new markets for its arms, obliged by providing
a $1
billion loan to the Nigerian government to purchase Russian made weapons.
Furthermore, following Nigeria’s cancellation
of a US military training programme over refusal to sell it combat
helicopters, Russia is now said to training Nigerian Special Forces in
counterinsurgency warfare. This has led many to suggest that perhaps an era of
renewed partnership between Nigeria and Russia is at hand.
Looking back at the trajectory of Nigeria-Russia bilateral
relations since independence in 1960 can offer useful lessons on the
opportunities and limits of a Nigeria-Russia rapprochement. It will also allow
for a more realistic assessment of how this potentially important and valuable
partnership can be strengthened and made more durable.
This post is the first of three instalments that will trace
the trajectory of Nigeria-Russia relations from 1960 to date, and make suggestions
for strengthening bilateral ties. This post will look at the state of the
relationship in the 1960s. The second instalment will continue the narrative
and look at the cordial ties of the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s when relations
stagnated and withered, and the period of renewed contacts in the 2000s. The
final instalment will discuss the opportunities and limits of a Russia-Nigeria
rapprochement in a changing world, and explore how bilateral relations can move
from an ‘elusive friendship’ to a more realistic and enduring partnership.
1960 – 1966: Distance and Suspicion
Nigeria’s first bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union in
the 1960s occurred against the backdrop of a highly polarised
international system, which shaped the nature of the relationship between the
two countries. Upon independence in 1960 Nigeria proclaimed itself to be
“nonaligned” in the Cold War conflict, and equidistant between the two
superpowers and the two blocs they led. The reality however was different.
The first indication of Nigeria’s western orientation was
the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact which Nigeria’s leaders had signed in 1958 under
colonial tutelage, and which was retained after independence. The Pact stated
Nigeria would acquire modern weapons, training, and technical assistance in
return for Britain maintaining military facilities in Lagos and Kano. The Pact
also allowed both countries “complete and unrestricted rights over each other’s
airspace”[4]. How Nigeria would have put into practice this privilege was any
one’s guess as it lacked both an air force at the time and a strategic need to
project power over northern Europe even if it had one. The Pact was eventually
repealed in January 1962 after strong domestic opposition[5].
The issue of diplomatic recognition and opening of embassies
was another indicator of Nigeria’s unequivocal western choice during this
period. Soon after independence Soviet officials, keen to cultivate ties and
expand contacts in Africa, approached Nigerian officials with a view to
establishing diplomatic relations. The advance was rebuffed[6].
Vocal domestic opposition and the need to maintain an image of nonalignment
eventually made the government reconsider its decision[7]. The Soviet Union was finally granted permission to open it Lagos embassy in March 1961[8]
– five months after Independence. Nigeria reciprocated a year later and opened
its Moscow embassy in 1962.
An Institute of Army Education study on ‘Nigeria’s Foreign
Policy, 1960-1976’ describes the restrictions that were placed on the Soviet
mission after the embassy was opened:
[W]hen the Soviet
embassy was established in Lagos in 1961, the number of its diplomatic staff
was limited to ten whereas no such restriction was placed on the diplomatic
missions of West European countries or the United States of America. The Soviet
embassy was allocated a paltry figure of five diplomatic car plates whereas
Britain and the United States of America were entitled to one hundred each. It
can therefore be asserted that even the opening of the Soviet embassy was grudgingly
conceded: a camouflage to the outside world that Nigeria was non-aligned[9].
Eghosa Osaghae, a scholar of Nigeria’s political history,
reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign policy in the First Republic (1960-1966), said:
[R]elations with
Britain and the West were conducted in a manner that sometimes cast doubts on
the country’s independence[10].
Similarly Joe Garba, Nigeria’s most famous soldier-diplomat,
commenting on this period, noted:
One weakness ... was
that although we were supposed to be nonaligned between the power blocs, this
was not always evident, to say the least, in our attitude[11].
Four factors best explain Nigeria’s strong pro-western
orientation and cold relations with the Soviet Union during this period.
Anti-Communism of the Ruling Elites
The first was the hostility of Nigeria’s ruling elites
towards communism and its atheist ethos; which led to a pervasive suspicion of
the Soviet Union. Nigeria’s ruling party in the First Republic, the Northern
People’s Congress (NPC), was led by the most conservative part of the Nigerian
establishment – the North’s aristocratic class. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the
Prime Minister, was said to harbour a deep seated fear of communism[12].
The Soviet’s for their part had a very dim view of Nigeria’s entire ruling
class at independence. The Africa correspondent of the Soviet mouthpiece Pravda described Ahmadu Bello, the
Premier of the Northern Region and arguably the most influential politician in
the country, as the “most reactionary figure on the contemporary Nigerian
stage”[13].
Similarly a publication to acquaint Soviet elites with the newly independent
Nigeria’s political landscape described the main opposition party as being led
of “feudal marionette princes of Yorubaland”[14].
To Northern Nigeria’s ruling class, expanding ties with the
Soviet Union beyond what was minimally necessary was perceived as a threat to the country’s religious and social order. As noted earlier,
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were only established following
pressure from domestic opposition. Aid and bilateral agreements from the
Eastern Bloc were rejected[15].
Osaghae’s highly readable and comprehensive overview of Nigeria’s
political history since Independence noted that:
Nigeria pursued a policy
that bordered on hostility towards the USSR and other members of the Eastern
Bloc – this was partly informed by Balewa’s personal fears of the dangers of
communism… [T]he Nigerian government … placed restrictions on travel to the
Eastern bloc countries and communist literature[16].
Anti-communist sentiments went beyond the Northern
establishment. In a tour of the United States a week before independence, Jaja
Wachukwu, the-then Speaker of the House of Representatives and an influential
south-eastern politician, confidently declared to his American hosts:
“Communism does not exist in Nigeria and cannot expect to exist”[17].
Pro-British Sentiment
The second was the deep sentimental affection which the
ruling elite at the time still felt for the former colonial power, Britain. Ibrahim
Gambari, one of Nigeria’s most respected diplomats and a Foreign affairs
minister in 1984-1985, explaining why Nigeria’s leaders retained the Anglo-Nigeria
Defence Pact after independence, said:
[T]he political
climate and attitude of Nigerian leaders just before independence were such
that any apparently reasonable British demand would be agreed to… [A]ll the
major political parties … went out of their way not to antagonize the British.
Indeed few Nigerian leaders or legislators challenged the British assumption
that in any government training of future Nigerian diplomats the British
Foreign Office would play the dominant if not exclusive role and that the
British would continue to represent Nigeria in many countries after
independence. It seemed, therefore, that the … Defence Agreement … was only
another dimension of the generally warm, though uneven, relations between
Nigeria and Britain[18].
A survey of the attitudes of the country’s political leaders
conducted in the 1960s underscores Nigeria’s pro-western
orientation during this period. 100 Federal legislators, selected through
random sampling, were asked how Nigeria should position itself in the Cold War
conflict. 50% said the country should be neutral, 41% said the country should
be aligned with the West, whereas a meagre 2% expressed a preference for an
alignment with the Soviet Union[19].
Economic Dependence
“British colonialism had helped to
fully incorporate Nigeria into the international capitalist order”[20].
Therefore as a recently decolonised, less developed, country on the margins of
the western capitalist system, Nigeria's economic and technological
underdevelopment inevitably placed it in a relationship of dependence on the
west for its social and economic development. Britain’s imperial departure from
Nigeria had been a negotiated exit which removed the empire’s political
presence but kept the economic umbilical cords connecting the former colony to
its metropole firmly in place. Consequently Nigeria’s foreign investment and
trade patterns continued to be dominated by Britain.
Banks such as Barclays
and Lloyds dominated Nigerian finance[21]. Two
British companies – John Holt and United Africa Company (UAC) – had a near
monopoly on the trading, import-export, manufacturing and distribution sectors.
The UAC, for example, controlled 41.3% of the country’s import and export trade[22]. Similarly
the First National Development Plan (1962-1968) heavily depended on western
finance to realise its goals. The NDP was the government’s master plan to place
the country on the path to economic development and industrialisation. 50% of
its funding however was to be sourced from western countries and western-led International Financial Institutions (IFI), such as IMF and the World Bank[23].
Furthermore Britain was to assist in negotiations with the IFIs and other bilateral
and multilateral donors[24].
Cold War Tension
The wider landscape of the Cold War provides the fourth lens
through which to view Nigeria’s inability to build enduring ties with the
Soviet Union during this period. Europe’s imperial powers, weakened by the
devastations of WWII and unable to reverse the growing tide of nationalism in
their colonies, sought instead to replace direct imperial control with loose
spheres of influence. This they felt would not only preserve their privileged
access to natural resources in the newly independent states, but also enable
them to maintain the pretence of great power status in a world now
unquestionably dominated by two superpowers.
The dénouement of Europe’s empires in the 1950s and 1960s however aslo coincided with the period
when Cold War tensions reached their peak; the Korean war of 1950-53, the beginning
of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the mid-1950s, the victory of
the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961, and the Cuban
Missile crisis of 1962, all profoundly destabilised superpower relations
between the United States and the Soviet. This consequently meant the United
States often actively encouraged and materially supported its European allies’ in
maintaining their spheres of influence, to block out Soviet penetration[25].
No one in Lagos could have failed to notice Guinea’s fate
when, in a referendum conducted across the entire French Union in September
1958, it rejected autonomy within a new French Community and
instead defiantly
chose immediate independence; the only one to do so. De Gaulle’s response
was swift, harsh, and extremely spiteful. Development assistance, bank credits,
and French civil servants were immediately withdrawn in a bid to collapse
Guinea’s economy and serve as a warning to others.
Elizabeth Schmidt’s Cold
War and Decolonization in Guinea 1946-1958 vividly describes France’s response:
[A]ll French technical
and administrative personnel were ordered to leave the territory. They were
directed to take with them or destroy all materials and archives, including
registers of vital statistics… Intense pressure was applied to teachers vacationing
outside of Guinea not to return to the territory after the referendum ...
[P]lans to build a major dam on the Konkouré River, which would provide Guinea
with a significant new source of hydroelectric power, were cancelled... Beyond
these economic penalties, technical services were sabotaged and equipment
destroyed.
Telephone wires were
cut, even in the main government building. Cranes at the port of Conakry
disappeared. Military camps were stripped of their equipment, and hospitals of
their medicines. Soldiers in Dalaba burned their barracks. In Sérédou, formulas
for the production of quinine vanished. In Beyla, French doctors absconded with
stocks of medicines from the hospitals and brand-new vehicles from the health
center, all of which were sent to the Ivory Coast. Finally, in a gesture laden
with pettiness and symbolism, state dishes were cracked[26].
Despite its discomfort with France’s behaviour, heightened Cold War tensions of the time meant the US chose
not to antagonise its NATO ally by extending aid to Guinea. As an official at
the State Department Policy Planning Staff noted of US policy towards the
decolonised states of Africa and Asia during this period:
Our policy should be
based on the general premise of the right to self-determination… Obviously, so
long as the present world tensions prevail, our national interest is closely
bound to precisely those countries which still to [a] greater or lesser degree
carry the stigma of colonial imperialism. When the tensions safely subside,
other considerations will become valid[27].
For Nigeria therefore, the highly adversarial Cold War
environment of the early 1960s and the country’s dependence on the west for its
economic development sharply curtailed its freedom of action on the global
stage. An “identity of interests, values and ideological orientation between …
the Nigerian ruling elite and their Western counterparts”[28]
further placed a distance between Nigeria and the Soviet Union during this
period.
The 30
month Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970) transformed the nature of
Nigeria-Soviet bilateral contacts and cleared the way for closer relations.
1967 – 1970: The Zenith of Friendship
Britain’s calculating response to arming the Federal
Government and the US’ arms embargo finally shed Nigerian officials of their
rose tinted view of relations with the west. In contrast, the Soviet Union’s
swift response to arming the Federal forces powerfully demonstrated the value
of enlarging diplomatic contacts with Moscow, and of diversifying the country’s
relationships more generally. Ironically the Soviet Union reportedly provided
only “about 30 per cent of the arms imported by the federal side”[29];
with Britain supplying the overwhelming bulk. The true value of the Soviet arms
contribution was in the calibre of weapons it provided – particularly jet
aircrafts and bombers which Britain and the United States refused to supply.
As the clouds of war gathered, on 2 July Gowon sent “identical wires to [US] President
[Lyndon] Johnson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson requesting the
immediate sale of twelve fighter-bombers, six [patrol] boats, and twenty-four
antiaircraft guns”, with “deliveries to begin within forty-eight hour”[30].
The response of Nigeria’s western partners was disappointing to say the least.
The United States, weighed down by its mounting troubles in Vietnam and
unwilling to be drawn into another Third World conflict, refused to sell arms
to the Federal Government. At a press conference on the outbreak of the war,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk signalled the US’ intentions to remain on the side
lines: “We regard Nigeria as part of Britain’s sphere of influence”[31].
Britain, with substantial investments in Nigeria, couldn’t
afford to be so detached. The antiaircraft guns, patrol boats, and much more
besides, were supplied; but, to the intense disappointment of Nigerian
officials, the fighter-bombers were “ruled out”[32].
The decision to sell Nigeria any arms at all had in fact only been taken after
extensive discussions within Whitehall – that “bore not a trace of sentimental
attachment to Colonial Nigeria”[33]
– about how best to protect British oil interests in the now rebel held Eastern
region. Soon after the war broke out, Britain’s High Commissioner in Lagos
cabled the Foreign Office in London:
In the new
circumstances it must clearly be a principle object of British policy to avoid
doing anything which could seriously antagonise the State of Biafra in case it
is successful in vindicating its independence. Our interests, particularly in
oil, are so great that they must override any lingering regret that we may feel
for the disintegration of British made Nigeria[34].
Although Britain eventually committed itself to Nigeria’s
territorial integrity and backed the Federal Government with diplomatic and
material support, Gary Blank’s detailed study, based on declassified documents,
of Whitehall’s decision making process during this period illuminates the
hard-nosed realism that shaped Britain’s ‘One Nigeria’ policy:
Analysis of the
primary documents reveals that London was never as committed to the FMG
[Federal Military Government] during the first months of the crisis as its
later pronouncements suggested. The ‘equivocal and non-committal’ nature of
London’s initial policy stemmed from a debate within the government and civil
service over the best way to serve ‘British interests’ – particularly economic
interests – amidst a highly tumultuous and uncertain series of events…[35]
[By December 1967,
however, after it became clear the FMG could win] all players now converged on
a ‘One Nigeria’ policy … [I]t was fully accepted by both the British government
and Shell-BP … that only the abject defeat of the Biafrans would ensure the
maintenance of Shell-BP’s investments, and – crucially for Britain – a resumption
of Nigerian oil flow[36].
For Moscow, the onset of hostilities provided it a “golden
chance” to improve relations with Lagos[37].
For Nigerian officials it cleared the way for a thaw in relations with the
Soviet Union. The Civil War saw a marked improvement in the previously distant
relationship.
Let down by the US’ and Britain’s response to its plea for
aircrafts, Nigeria looked elsewhere and found the Soviet Union “waiting in the
wings”[38].
On August 2 1967, a Nigerian delegation led by Chief Anthony Enahoro, the-then
Minister of Information and Labour, signed an arms deal, under the cover of a “cultural
agreement”, with Soviet officials in Moscow[39].
A week later, 9 August, two jet fighters were delivered to Nigeria. By
mid-August, up to 20 jet aircrafts and 200 Soviet technicians had reached
Nigeria[40].
In 1969, after supplying only air weapons for the preceding two years, the
Soviet Union scaled up its material support by adding ground weapons –
including artillery and a “considerable number” of rifles[41].
Some scholars suggest Soviet supplied artillery “played a crucial part in the final
determination of the conflict”[42].
Off the back of the Civil War cooperation, trade picked up
between the two countries. Though much of the increase was due to the arms
sales, Nigeria’s economic engagement with the Soviet Union nevertheless
broadened during the war years. Soviet manufactured and consumer goods –
passenger cars, cement, sugar, fabric, welding machines etc. – made their first
appearance in Nigeria; and the Soviet Union imported, amongst other things,
cocoa beans, palm oil products and timber from Nigeria[43].
The intensity of contacts similarly increased. A highly
publicised goodwill visit to Moscow in mid-1968 was undertaken by Nigeria’s
Foreign Minister, underscoring the warming ties between the two countries. The
final communique from the trip became “the first ever document signed
between Nigeria and the Soviet Union”[44].
The restrictions that had previously been placed on the Soviet embassy were
relaxed, and the Soviet Union was allowed to open a new embassy chancery and
host cultural activities[45].
The Federal Government also finally consented to the arrival of a Soviet
military attaché[46],
where only Britain and the US had enjoyed such diplomatic privileges.
The deepening and broadening of contacts during this period
however, whilst placing bilateral relations on a more positive trajectory, in
retrospect marked the zenith of Nigeria-Soviet cooperation.
The next instalment will look at Nigeria-Soviet, and then Russia,
relations from the 1970s to the 2000s.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Anthony
O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity:
The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska
Knjiga.
Eghosa
E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant:
Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co.
Elizabeth
Schmidt. (2007), Cold War and Decolonization
in Guinea, 1946-1958. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Fredrik
Lovevall. (2012), Embers of War: The Fall
of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House.
Guy Arnold. (2008), The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa.
Plymouth: Scarecrow Press.
Jimi Peters. (1997), The Nigerian Military and the State.
London: Tauris Academic Studies.
Maxim Matusevich. (2003), No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and
Pragmatism in Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991. Asmara: Africa World
Press.
Maxim Matusevich. (2007), ‘An
Elusive Friendship: Nigeria-Soviet/Russian Relations, 1960-2000’, in Ulric R.
Nichol (ed.), Focus on Politics and
Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Odd A. Westad. (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World
Interventions and the Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Journal Articles
Gary
Blank. (2011), ‘Britain, Biafra and the Balance of Payments: The Formation of
London’s ‘One Nigeria’ Policy’, London
School of Economics. Download PDF here.
Gerald
E. Ezirim. (2011), ‘Fifty Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: A Critical
Review’. Download PDF version here.
Oye
Ogunbadejo. (1988), ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 346: pp. 83-104.
R.
A. Akindele. (1986), ‘Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985: PART
II: With Special Emphasis on External Loan Transactions, Foreign Private Investment
and Geographical Expansion of Trade Frontiers’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 21, No. 2.
Shohei
Sato. (2009), ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-1968:
A Pattern and a Puzzle’, Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, No. 1: pp. 99-117.
[1]
Maxim Matusevich. (2007), ‘An Elusive Friendship: Nigeria-Soviet/Russian
Relations, 1960-2000’, in Ulric R. Nichol (ed.), Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe. New
York: Nova Science Publishers, p. 198.
[2]
Oye Ogunbadejo. (1988), ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 346: pp.
84-88.
[3]
Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, Ch. 9.
[4] Jimi Peters. (1997), The Nigerian Military and the State. London: Tauris Academic Studies, p. 72.
[5] Ibid, p. 75.
[6] Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 196.
[7] The influential West African Pilot summed up popular sentiment when, in an editorial on the 25th of October in favour of establishing diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, it stated: “The people of Nigeria have nothing against the Soviet Union. Some of us may hate or abhor communism but that does not mean we have nothing to learn from a country that sent its rocket to the moon… We want a Soviet diplomatic mission in Lagos”. (Italics in original). Quoted in Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 197.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Quoted in Gerald E. Ezirim. (2011), ‘Fifty Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: A Critical Review’.
[10] Eghosa E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 51.
[11] Quoted in Anthony O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, p. 310.
[10] Eghosa E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 51.
[11] Quoted in Anthony O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, p. 310.
[12] Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence, p. 50.; See also Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, pp. 194-201.
[13] Quoted in Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 195.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, p. 51.
[16] Ibid, p. 50-51.
[17] Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Freindship’, p. 196.
[18] Jimi Peters, The Nigerian Military and the State, p. 74.
[19] Maxim Matusevich. (2003), No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991. Asmara: Africa World Press, p. 105.
[20] Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, p. 88.
[21] Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 47-50.
[22] Ibid, p. 47.
[23] R. A. Akindele. (1986), ‘Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985: PART II: With Special Emphasis on External Loan Transactions, Foreign Private Investment and Geographical Expansion of Trade Frontiers’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 21, No. 2: p. 144.
[24] Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 47-48.
[25] Fredrik Logevall’s fascinating and comprehensive study of the French Indochina war (1946-1954) sheds light on the US role in France’s colonial war. The US essentially financed and armed France. While France was fighting to reconstitute its empire, the US viewed the war as an anti-communist crusade against the Soviet and Chinese supported Vietminh. By 1952 French officials were already thinking of pulling out the war but US pressure kept France fighting until French forces were decisively defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Fredrik Lovevall. (2012), Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House.
Another example was the US pressure on Britain to keep its military presence in southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf after the British Government announced in 1968 that it was withdrawing from those areas by 1971 due to economic difficulties at home. Failing to convince the British to stay, the US stepped in to replace Britain as those region’s strategic guarantor. Shohei Sato. (2009), ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-1968: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, No. 1: pp. 99-117.
[26] Elizabeth Schmidt. (2007), Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958. Ohio: Ohio University Press, pp. 171-172.
[27] Odd A. Westad. (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131-132.
[28] Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, p. 84.
[29] Guy Arnold. (2008), The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, p. 165.
[30] Maxim Matusevich, No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe, pp. 112-113.
[31] Guy Arnold, The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa, p. 265.
[32] Gary Blank. (2011), ‘Britain, Biafra and the Balance of Payments: The Formation of London’s ‘One Nigeria’ Policy’, London School of Economics, p. 79.
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