From ‘Elusive Friendship’ to Realistic Partnership (Part I)
Opportunities and Limits of a Nigeria-Russia Rapprochement
|President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Vladimir Putin
signing the “Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership”
between Nigeria and Russia, March 6 2001 (Kremlin.ru)|
20 May 1974, General Yakubu Gowon departed Lagos for an 8-day State visit to the Soviet Union. The first ever such visit by a Nigerian Head of State. It was a symbolic gesture of gratitude to the Soviet Union for helping the Federal Government win the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). It was also meant to open a new chapter in bilateral relations between the two countries. A state of “high alert” and ideological suspicion had characterised the relationship before the Civil War. There were high hopes at the time that, guided by pragmatism and mutual interests, cooperation would now deepen. Despite this optimism however, bilateral ties never moved beyond what Maxim Matusevich, a scholar on Nigeria-Russia relations, describes as an “elusive friendship … forever fluctuating between protracted periods of stagnation and an occasional declaration of friendship”.
Nigeria’s recent difficulties in procuring weapons from the United States to better combat Boko Haram has seen it turn once more to Russia for help; a move reminiscent of the Civil War days when the Soviet Union armed Nigeria following equivocations from its western partners. Russia, keen to expand its influence in Africa and find new markets for its arms, obliged by providing a $1 billion loan to the Nigerian government to purchase Russian made weapons. Furthermore, following Nigeria’s cancellation of a US military training programme over refusal to sell it combat helicopters, Russia is now said to training Nigerian Special Forces in counterinsurgency warfare. This has led many to suggest that perhaps an era of renewed partnership between Nigeria and Russia is at hand.
Looking back at the trajectory of Nigeria-Russia bilateral relations since independence in 1960 can offer useful lessons on the opportunities and limits of a Nigeria-Russia rapprochement. It will also allow for a more realistic assessment of how this potentially important and valuable partnership can be strengthened and made more durable.
This post is the first of three instalments that will trace the trajectory of Nigeria-Russia relations from 1960 to date, and make suggestions for strengthening bilateral ties. This post will look at the state of the relationship in the 1960s. The second instalment will continue the narrative and look at the cordial ties of the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s when relations stagnated and withered, and the period of renewed contacts in the 2000s. The final instalment will discuss the opportunities and limits of a Russia-Nigeria rapprochement in a changing world, and explore how bilateral relations can move from an ‘elusive friendship’ to a more realistic and enduring partnership.
1960 – 1966: Distance and Suspicion
Nigeria’s first bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union in the 1960s occurred against the backdrop of a highly polarised international system, which shaped the nature of the relationship between the two countries. Upon independence in 1960 Nigeria proclaimed itself to be “nonaligned” in the Cold War conflict, and equidistant between the two superpowers and the two blocs they led. The reality however was different.
The first indication of Nigeria’s western orientation was the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact which Nigeria’s leaders had signed in 1958 under colonial tutelage, and which was retained after independence. The Pact stated Nigeria would acquire modern weapons, training, and technical assistance in return for Britain maintaining military facilities in Lagos and Kano. The Pact also allowed both countries “complete and unrestricted rights over each other’s airspace”. How Nigeria would have put into practice this privilege was any one’s guess as it lacked both an air force at the time and a strategic need to project power over northern Europe even if it had one. The Pact was eventually repealed in January 1962 after strong domestic opposition.
The issue of diplomatic recognition and opening of embassies was another indicator of Nigeria’s unequivocal western choice during this period. Soon after independence Soviet officials, keen to cultivate ties and expand contacts in Africa, approached Nigerian officials with a view to establishing diplomatic relations. The advance was rebuffed. Vocal domestic opposition and the need to maintain an image of nonalignment eventually made the government reconsider its decision. The Soviet Union was finally granted permission to open it Lagos embassy in March 1961 – five months after Independence. Nigeria reciprocated a year later and opened its Moscow embassy in 1962.
An Institute of Army Education study on ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-1976’ describes the restrictions that were placed on the Soviet mission after the embassy was opened:
[W]hen the Soviet embassy was established in Lagos in 1961, the number of its diplomatic staff was limited to ten whereas no such restriction was placed on the diplomatic missions of West European countries or the United States of America. The Soviet embassy was allocated a paltry figure of five diplomatic car plates whereas Britain and the United States of America were entitled to one hundred each. It can therefore be asserted that even the opening of the Soviet embassy was grudgingly conceded: a camouflage to the outside world that Nigeria was non-aligned.
Eghosa Osaghae, a scholar of Nigeria’s political history, reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign policy in the First Republic (1960-1966), said:
[R]elations with Britain and the West were conducted in a manner that sometimes cast doubts on the country’s independence.
Similarly Joe Garba, Nigeria’s most famous soldier-diplomat, commenting on this period, noted:
One weakness ... was that although we were supposed to be nonaligned between the power blocs, this was not always evident, to say the least, in our attitude.
Four factors best explain Nigeria’s strong pro-western orientation and cold relations with the Soviet Union during this period.
Anti-Communism of the Ruling Elites
The first was the hostility of Nigeria’s ruling elites towards communism and its atheist ethos; which led to a pervasive suspicion of the Soviet Union. Nigeria’s ruling party in the First Republic, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), was led by the most conservative part of the Nigerian establishment – the North’s aristocratic class. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, was said to harbour a deep seated fear of communism. The Soviet’s for their part had a very dim view of Nigeria’s entire ruling class at independence. The Africa correspondent of the Soviet mouthpiece Pravda described Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region and arguably the most influential politician in the country, as the “most reactionary figure on the contemporary Nigerian stage”. Similarly a publication to acquaint Soviet elites with the newly independent Nigeria’s political landscape described the main opposition party as being led of “feudal marionette princes of Yorubaland”.
To Northern Nigeria’s ruling class, expanding ties with the Soviet Union beyond what was minimally necessary was perceived as a threat to the country’s religious and social order. As noted earlier, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were only established following pressure from domestic opposition. Aid and bilateral agreements from the Eastern Bloc were rejected.
Osaghae’s highly readable and comprehensive overview of Nigeria’s political history since Independence noted that:
Nigeria pursued a policy that bordered on hostility towards the USSR and other members of the Eastern Bloc – this was partly informed by Balewa’s personal fears of the dangers of communism… [T]he Nigerian government … placed restrictions on travel to the Eastern bloc countries and communist literature.
Anti-communist sentiments went beyond the Northern establishment. In a tour of the United States a week before independence, Jaja Wachukwu, the-then Speaker of the House of Representatives and an influential south-eastern politician, confidently declared to his American hosts: “Communism does not exist in Nigeria and cannot expect to exist”.
The second was the deep sentimental affection which the ruling elite at the time still felt for the former colonial power, Britain. Ibrahim Gambari, one of Nigeria’s most respected diplomats and a Foreign affairs minister in 1984-1985, explaining why Nigeria’s leaders retained the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact after independence, said:
[T]he political climate and attitude of Nigerian leaders just before independence were such that any apparently reasonable British demand would be agreed to… [A]ll the major political parties … went out of their way not to antagonize the British. Indeed few Nigerian leaders or legislators challenged the British assumption that in any government training of future Nigerian diplomats the British Foreign Office would play the dominant if not exclusive role and that the British would continue to represent Nigeria in many countries after independence. It seemed, therefore, that the … Defence Agreement … was only another dimension of the generally warm, though uneven, relations between Nigeria and Britain.
A survey of the attitudes of the country’s political leaders conducted in the 1960s underscores Nigeria’s pro-western orientation during this period. 100 Federal legislators, selected through random sampling, were asked how Nigeria should position itself in the Cold War conflict. 50% said the country should be neutral, 41% said the country should be aligned with the West, whereas a meagre 2% expressed a preference for an alignment with the Soviet Union.
“British colonialism had helped to fully incorporate Nigeria into the international capitalist order”. Therefore as a recently decolonised, less developed, country on the margins of the western capitalist system, Nigeria's economic and technological underdevelopment inevitably placed it in a relationship of dependence on the west for its social and economic development. Britain’s imperial departure from Nigeria had been a negotiated exit which removed the empire’s political presence but kept the economic umbilical cords connecting the former colony to its metropole firmly in place. Consequently Nigeria’s foreign investment and trade patterns continued to be dominated by Britain.
Banks such as Barclays and Lloyds dominated Nigerian finance. Two British companies – John Holt and United Africa Company (UAC) – had a near monopoly on the trading, import-export, manufacturing and distribution sectors. The UAC, for example, controlled 41.3% of the country’s import and export trade. Similarly the First National Development Plan (1962-1968) heavily depended on western finance to realise its goals. The NDP was the government’s master plan to place the country on the path to economic development and industrialisation. 50% of its funding however was to be sourced from western countries and western-led International Financial Institutions (IFI), such as IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore Britain was to assist in negotiations with the IFIs and other bilateral and multilateral donors.
Cold War Tension
The wider landscape of the Cold War provides the fourth lens through which to view Nigeria’s inability to build enduring ties with the Soviet Union during this period. Europe’s imperial powers, weakened by the devastations of WWII and unable to reverse the growing tide of nationalism in their colonies, sought instead to replace direct imperial control with loose spheres of influence. This they felt would not only preserve their privileged access to natural resources in the newly independent states, but also enable them to maintain the pretence of great power status in a world now unquestionably dominated by two superpowers.
The dénouement of Europe’s empires in the 1950s and 1960s however aslo coincided with the period when Cold War tensions reached their peak; the Korean war of 1950-53, the beginning of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the mid-1950s, the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961, and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, all profoundly destabilised superpower relations between the United States and the Soviet. This consequently meant the United States often actively encouraged and materially supported its European allies’ in maintaining their spheres of influence, to block out Soviet penetration.
No one in Lagos could have failed to notice Guinea’s fate when, in a referendum conducted across the entire French Union in September 1958, it rejected autonomy within a new French Community and instead defiantly chose immediate independence; the only one to do so. De Gaulle’s response was swift, harsh, and extremely spiteful. Development assistance, bank credits, and French civil servants were immediately withdrawn in a bid to collapse Guinea’s economy and serve as a warning to others.
Elizabeth Schmidt’s Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea 1946-1958 vividly describes France’s response:
[A]ll French technical and administrative personnel were ordered to leave the territory. They were directed to take with them or destroy all materials and archives, including registers of vital statistics… Intense pressure was applied to teachers vacationing outside of Guinea not to return to the territory after the referendum ... [P]lans to build a major dam on the Konkouré River, which would provide Guinea with a significant new source of hydroelectric power, were cancelled... Beyond these economic penalties, technical services were sabotaged and equipment destroyed.
Telephone wires were cut, even in the main government building. Cranes at the port of Conakry disappeared. Military camps were stripped of their equipment, and hospitals of their medicines. Soldiers in Dalaba burned their barracks. In Sérédou, formulas for the production of quinine vanished. In Beyla, French doctors absconded with stocks of medicines from the hospitals and brand-new vehicles from the health center, all of which were sent to the Ivory Coast. Finally, in a gesture laden with pettiness and symbolism, state dishes were cracked.
Despite its discomfort with France’s behaviour, heightened Cold War tensions of the time meant the US chose not to antagonise its NATO ally by extending aid to Guinea. As an official at the State Department Policy Planning Staff noted of US policy towards the decolonised states of Africa and Asia during this period:
Our policy should be based on the general premise of the right to self-determination… Obviously, so long as the present world tensions prevail, our national interest is closely bound to precisely those countries which still to [a] greater or lesser degree carry the stigma of colonial imperialism. When the tensions safely subside, other considerations will become valid.
For Nigeria therefore, the highly adversarial Cold War environment of the early 1960s and the country’s dependence on the west for its economic development sharply curtailed its freedom of action on the global stage. An “identity of interests, values and ideological orientation between … the Nigerian ruling elite and their Western counterparts” further placed a distance between Nigeria and the Soviet Union during this period.
The 30 month Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970) transformed the nature of Nigeria-Soviet bilateral contacts and cleared the way for closer relations.
1967 – 1970: The Zenith of Friendship
Britain’s calculating response to arming the Federal Government and the US’ arms embargo finally shed Nigerian officials of their rose tinted view of relations with the west. In contrast, the Soviet Union’s swift response to arming the Federal forces powerfully demonstrated the value of enlarging diplomatic contacts with Moscow, and of diversifying the country’s relationships more generally. Ironically the Soviet Union reportedly provided only “about 30 per cent of the arms imported by the federal side”; with Britain supplying the overwhelming bulk. The true value of the Soviet arms contribution was in the calibre of weapons it provided – particularly jet aircrafts and bombers which Britain and the United States refused to supply.
As the clouds of war gathered, on 2 July Gowon sent “identical wires to [US] President [Lyndon] Johnson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson requesting the immediate sale of twelve fighter-bombers, six [patrol] boats, and twenty-four antiaircraft guns”, with “deliveries to begin within forty-eight hour”. The response of Nigeria’s western partners was disappointing to say the least. The United States, weighed down by its mounting troubles in Vietnam and unwilling to be drawn into another Third World conflict, refused to sell arms to the Federal Government. At a press conference on the outbreak of the war, Secretary of State Dean Rusk signalled the US’ intentions to remain on the side lines: “We regard Nigeria as part of Britain’s sphere of influence”.
Britain, with substantial investments in Nigeria, couldn’t afford to be so detached. The antiaircraft guns, patrol boats, and much more besides, were supplied; but, to the intense disappointment of Nigerian officials, the fighter-bombers were “ruled out”. The decision to sell Nigeria any arms at all had in fact only been taken after extensive discussions within Whitehall – that “bore not a trace of sentimental attachment to Colonial Nigeria” – about how best to protect British oil interests in the now rebel held Eastern region. Soon after the war broke out, Britain’s High Commissioner in Lagos cabled the Foreign Office in London:
In the new circumstances it must clearly be a principle object of British policy to avoid doing anything which could seriously antagonise the State of Biafra in case it is successful in vindicating its independence. Our interests, particularly in oil, are so great that they must override any lingering regret that we may feel for the disintegration of British made Nigeria.
Although Britain eventually committed itself to Nigeria’s territorial integrity and backed the Federal Government with diplomatic and material support, Gary Blank’s detailed study, based on declassified documents, of Whitehall’s decision making process during this period illuminates the hard-nosed realism that shaped Britain’s ‘One Nigeria’ policy:
Analysis of the primary documents reveals that London was never as committed to the FMG [Federal Military Government] during the first months of the crisis as its later pronouncements suggested. The ‘equivocal and non-committal’ nature of London’s initial policy stemmed from a debate within the government and civil service over the best way to serve ‘British interests’ – particularly economic interests – amidst a highly tumultuous and uncertain series of events…
[By December 1967, however, after it became clear the FMG could win] all players now converged on a ‘One Nigeria’ policy … [I]t was fully accepted by both the British government and Shell-BP … that only the abject defeat of the Biafrans would ensure the maintenance of Shell-BP’s investments, and – crucially for Britain – a resumption of Nigerian oil flow.
For Moscow, the onset of hostilities provided it a “golden chance” to improve relations with Lagos. For Nigerian officials it cleared the way for a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union. The Civil War saw a marked improvement in the previously distant relationship.
Let down by the US’ and Britain’s response to its plea for aircrafts, Nigeria looked elsewhere and found the Soviet Union “waiting in the wings”. On August 2 1967, a Nigerian delegation led by Chief Anthony Enahoro, the-then Minister of Information and Labour, signed an arms deal, under the cover of a “cultural agreement”, with Soviet officials in Moscow. A week later, 9 August, two jet fighters were delivered to Nigeria. By mid-August, up to 20 jet aircrafts and 200 Soviet technicians had reached Nigeria. In 1969, after supplying only air weapons for the preceding two years, the Soviet Union scaled up its material support by adding ground weapons – including artillery and a “considerable number” of rifles.
Some scholars suggest Soviet supplied artillery “played a crucial part in the final determination of the conflict”.
Off the back of the Civil War cooperation, trade picked up between the two countries. Though much of the increase was due to the arms sales, Nigeria’s economic engagement with the Soviet Union nevertheless broadened during the war years. Soviet manufactured and consumer goods – passenger cars, cement, sugar, fabric, welding machines etc. – made their first appearance in Nigeria; and the Soviet Union imported, amongst other things, cocoa beans, palm oil products and timber from Nigeria.
The intensity of contacts similarly increased. A highly publicised goodwill visit to Moscow in mid-1968 was undertaken by Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, underscoring the warming ties between the two countries. The final communique from the trip became “the first ever document signed between Nigeria and the Soviet Union”. The restrictions that had previously been placed on the Soviet embassy were relaxed, and the Soviet Union was allowed to open a new embassy chancery and host cultural activities. The Federal Government also finally consented to the arrival of a Soviet military attaché, where only Britain and the US had enjoyed such diplomatic privileges.
The deepening and broadening of contacts during this period however, whilst placing bilateral relations on a more positive trajectory, in retrospect marked the zenith of Nigeria-Soviet cooperation.
The next instalment will look at Nigeria-Soviet, and then Russia, relations from the 1970s to the 2000s.
Anthony O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga.
Eghosa E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co.
Elizabeth Schmidt. (2007), Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Fredrik Lovevall. (2012), Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House.
Guy Arnold. (2008), The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press.
Jimi Peters. (1997), The Nigerian Military and the State. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
Maxim Matusevich. (2003), No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991. Asmara: Africa World Press.
Maxim Matusevich. (2007), ‘An Elusive Friendship: Nigeria-Soviet/Russian Relations, 1960-2000’, in Ulric R. Nichol (ed.), Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Odd A. Westad. (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gary Blank. (2011), ‘Britain, Biafra and the Balance of Payments: The Formation of London’s ‘One Nigeria’ Policy’, London School of Economics. Download PDF here.
Gerald E. Ezirim. (2011), ‘Fifty Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: A Critical Review’. Download PDF version here.
Oye Ogunbadejo. (1988), ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 346: pp. 83-104.
R. A. Akindele. (1986), ‘Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985: PART II: With Special Emphasis on External Loan Transactions, Foreign Private Investment and Geographical Expansion of Trade Frontiers’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 21, No. 2.
Shohei Sato. (2009), ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-1968: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, No. 1: pp. 99-117.
 Maxim Matusevich. (2007), ‘An Elusive Friendship: Nigeria-Soviet/Russian Relations, 1960-2000’, in Ulric R. Nichol (ed.), Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe. New York: Nova Science Publishers, p. 198.
 Oye Ogunbadejo. (1988), ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 346: pp. 84-88.
 Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, Ch. 9.
 Jimi Peters. (1997), The Nigerian Military and the State. London: Tauris Academic Studies, p. 72.
 Ibid, p. 75.
 Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 196.
 The influential West African Pilot summed up popular sentiment when, in an editorial on the 25th of October in favour of establishing diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, it stated: “The people of Nigeria have nothing against the Soviet Union. Some of us may hate or abhor communism but that does not mean we have nothing to learn from a country that sent its rocket to the moon… We want a Soviet diplomatic mission in Lagos”. (Italics in original). Quoted in Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 197.
 Quoted in Gerald E. Ezirim. (2011), ‘Fifty Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: A Critical Review’.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 51.
 Quoted in Anthony O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, p. 310.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae. (1998), Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 51.
 Quoted in Anthony O. Ojigbo. (1979), 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, p. 310.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence, p. 50.; See also Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, pp. 194-201.
 Quoted in Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 195.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, p. 51.
 Ibid, p. 50-51.
 Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Freindship’, p. 196.
 Jimi Peters, The Nigerian Military and the State, p. 74.
 Maxim Matusevich. (2003), No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991. Asmara: Africa World Press, p. 105.
 Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, p. 88.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 47-50.
 Ibid, p. 47.
 R. A. Akindele. (1986), ‘Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985: PART II: With Special Emphasis on External Loan Transactions, Foreign Private Investment and Geographical Expansion of Trade Frontiers’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 21, No. 2: p. 144.
 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 47-48.
 Fredrik Logevall’s fascinating and comprehensive study of the French Indochina war (1946-1954) sheds light on the US role in France’s colonial war. The US essentially financed and armed France. While France was fighting to reconstitute its empire, the US viewed the war as an anti-communist crusade against the Soviet and Chinese supported Vietminh. By 1952 French officials were already thinking of pulling out the war but US pressure kept France fighting until French forces were decisively defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Fredrik Lovevall. (2012), Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House.
Another example was the US pressure on Britain to keep its military presence in southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf after the British Government announced in 1968 that it was withdrawing from those areas by 1971 due to economic difficulties at home. Failing to convince the British to stay, the US stepped in to replace Britain as those region’s strategic guarantor. Shohei Sato. (2009), ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-1968: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, No. 1: pp. 99-117.
 Elizabeth Schmidt. (2007), Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958. Ohio: Ohio University Press, pp. 171-172.
 Odd A. Westad. (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131-132.
 Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria-Soviet Relations, 1960-1987’, p. 84.
 Guy Arnold. (2008), The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, p. 165.
 Maxim Matusevich, No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe, pp. 112-113.
 Guy Arnold, The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa, p. 265.
 Gary Blank. (2011), ‘Britain, Biafra and the Balance of Payments: The Formation of London’s ‘One Nigeria’ Policy’, London School of Economics, p. 79.
 Ibid, p. 73.
 Quoted in Ibid, p. 76.
 Ibid, p. 76.
 Ibid, p. 82.
 Maxim Matusevich, ‘An Elusive Friendship’, p. 203.
 Maxim Matusevich, No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe, pp. 113-114.
 Ibid, p. 114.