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Friday, 10 January 2014

Nigeria's First Republic, 1960 - 1966

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In popular discourse, the First Republic is often portrayed as a vanished Eden; untarnished by the corruption and instability that pervades our present democratic polity. But was this really the case? 


Nigeria's founding fathers, and the leading personlities of the First Republic. From Left to Right: Obafemi Awolowo (Leader of the opposition); Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Federal Prime Minister); Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the Northern Region); Nnamdi Azikiwe (President of the Federation).

Other leading personalities that dominated the politics of the First Republic. Left: Samuel Ladoke Akintola (Premier of the Western Region and the political rival of Awolowo); Michael Okpara (Premier of the Eastern Region); Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro (Became leader of Awolowo's party in 1963 after Awolowo went to jail).












 The “First Republic” was Nigeria’s first civilian democratic polity. It lasted from the 1st of October 1960, when Nigeria became independent, to the 15th of January 1966, when a section of the army mutinied, abducted and killed the federal Prime Minister, Finance Minister and several other senior political office holders and military officers, in an attempted coup d’état - or “military revolution”, as the mutineers termed their action. Despite its short political life and bloody demise, most Nigerians reflect on the era of the First Republic with an almost romantic yearning to return to those days.

This positive view stems primarily from the fact that it was led by the nation’s “founding fathers” – individuals whom Nigerians generally hold in high esteem. Inevitably their stardust rubs off on the republic they led. Another factor which explains this positive view the fact that with contemporary Nigerian politics mired in colossal corruption and sleaze, many Nigerians seek solace in the ‘good old days’ by re-imagining our first post-colonial elites as saint-leaders who presided over a vanished Eden free of ethnic politics, corruption, and political violence.

Despite the  narrative of a utopian kingdom led by saintly visionaries, the fact is the First Republic was a structurally weak and crisis ridden polity.

This article is divided into two parts. In the first, I examine the four main structural weaknesses which formed the background conditions for political crisis. In the second part, I turn my attention to the five political crises which brought down the First Republic.

Background to Crises: Four Structural Weaknesses of the First Republic


The First Republic was born on the 1st of October 1960 in a blaze of optimism, and it disappeared on the 15th of January 1966 in a hail of gunshots. To my mind, there were four structural weaknesses which made it prone to instability.

1       Ethnically based Federal Regions and their uneven size and power

The structural weakness which primed the First Republic for political crisis was its ethnically based federal regions and the asymmetry in size and power between them. Upon independence, Nigeria was composed of three federating regions: Northern, Eastern and Western regions. In 1963 a new region – the Mid-West – was carved out of the West following a crisis in that region, but more on that in the second section.

These three regions were largely autonomous from the federal centre, and were constitutionally very powerful. Each of the regions was dominated by one of the country’s three major ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani in the North, Igbo in the East and Yoruba in the West. This tripodal ethno-federal arrangement presided over by the dominant ethnic groups placed minorities at a considerable disadvantage in the competition for jobs and resources. It also allowed the elites of the three major ethnic groups to monopolise access to federal patronage, which they leveraged for support. As Sklar, an historian of Nigeria's political parties during this period, puts it:

In their respective regions, the leaders of these dominant nationality groups controlled the means of access to wealth and power… [T]hey tended to equate their private interests with the objective interests of their nationality groups; conversely, they exploited the sentiments of their groups to promote their private interests.
Of the three regions, the North was much larger demographically and geographically (See Fig. 1 & Chart 1). Consequently, it was allocated more than half the seats in the federal parliament (See Chart 2). This meant that a party could potentially govern the country by winning votes from the North alone. This not only made the Hausa-Fulani elites extremely regional in outlook, it also heightened the fear of northern hegemony amongst Yoruba and Igbo elites.  


Figure 1: Nigeria's three federal regions, with the federal capital of Lagos. The figures inserted are their populations based on the 1952-53 census. SOURCE: Map: Wikipedia; Population: Diamond's Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, p. 133. Note: The figure for the Western region includes Lagos’ population which was 300,000. TOTAL POPULATION: 30,400,000.


The fact that the country’s federal regions broadly coincided with – and reinforced – the nation’s ethnic cleavages, the exclusion of minorities from each region’s political and economic structures, and the structural tensions which resulted from the Northern region being large enough to dominate its two southern counterparts in parliament, set the scene for the political conflicts which consumed the First Republic.

2.       Ethno-Regional Political Parties

The second structural weakness which afflicted the First Republic was the association between political party and ethno-regional identity. This meant politics largely “revolved around ethnic-based regional…parties”. Reflecting the tripodal ethnic balance, three parties bestrode the political scene like titans and thus shaped the destiny of the First Republic: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG), and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC).

All three parties originally emerged out of ethno-cultural associations: the NPC from the Jam’iyar Mutanen Arewa (The Association of Peoples of the North); the AG from the Egbe omo Oduduwa (Society for the descendants of Oduduwa. Yoruba folklore presents Oduduwa as the ancestral progenitor of their people); and the NCNC from the Igbo State Union. As a result, these three parties reflected, shaped, and intensified the nation’s ethno-regional cleavages.


PARTY
NORTHERN REGION
WESTERN REGION
EASTERN REGION
LAGOS (CAPITAL)
TOTAL SEATS WON
NPC
134
0
0
0
134 (43%)
NCNC
8 (These seats were won by Aminu Kano's radical northern party which was in alliance with the NCNC) 
21
58
2
89 (29%)
AG
25
33
14
1
73 (23%)
OTHERS
7
8
1
0
16 (5%)

Table 1: The parliament had 312 seats and these show the distribution of seats won by the major parties after the 1959 General Elections. The election determined “which parties were to control the federal government” in a soon to be independent Nigeria. Source: Osaghae (1998; pp. 32 & 33).


The three dominant parties


The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), as the name suggests, was a “Hausa-Fulani dominated party” which held sway in the North. Of the three parties, it was the most entrenched in its regional identity. Nothing illustrates this more than its name, and the fact that in the 1959 eve of independence general election it did not field a single candidate in the other regions – hence, as Table 1 shows, all its seats were won in its home region. The NPC’s foundational aim was to protect the conservative social hierarchy of the North from the “winds of radical change sweeping up from the south”, as an historian of this era puts it. The party chairman, who was also the Regional Premier (the Premiers were the political leaders of the Regions), was Ahmadu Bello – a titled prince from the region’s aristocratic ruling class. By virtue of having won the largest amount of seats in the election of ‘59, the party was conferred the privilege of forming the government. However, as Table 1 above shows, it fell just short of winning the majority needed to govern alone; hence it had to form a coalition with one of the two main southern parties. Illustrative of the constitutional power of the Regions, Ahmadu Bello, who should have been the Prime Minister – as he was the party leader – instead chose to remain the North's Regional Premier, preferring to send his party deputy, Tafawa Balewa, to Lagos (the federal capital) to lead the government. This would be analogous to a politician today passing up the opportunity to become President, choosing instead to remain a state Governor.

The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was the southern party which entered into coalition with the NPC as a junior partner in government. It was a decision for which it was richly rewarded when the coalition came into being shortly before independence. “Party stalwarts got plum ministerial and ambassadorial posts” including the Presidency (a largely ceremonial role at the time) which went to Nnamdi Azikiwe, one of the party’s founders, and the Finance ministry which went to Festus Okotie-Eboh, the party’s national treasurer. 

The NCNC, as its name indicates, originally hoped to project a nationalist, pan-Nigerian image, but the ethnic regionalism which the country's federal structure encouraged gradually shrivelled its political horizons; and it increasingly became the “voice of Igbo nationalism”. Like the NPC, the party’s chairman, Michael Okpara, chose to remain as Regional Premier after the ‘59 election rather than take up a seat in the federal cabinet. But unlike the NPC, the NCNC campaigned in the other two regions during the election and indeed won seats in the West, and – in alliance with a small radical party – won seats in the North as well.

The Action Group (AG) is the last party which completes our tripartite list. The AG, like its southern counterpart, the NCNC, initially aspired to be more than a regional party. It's advertised political ideology was based on a variant of socialism which it hoped would resonate with the working class and peasant population of the other regions. However, trapped by the nature of the political terrain, party elites soon concluded that “the only certain avenue to power was a regional political party”; hence the AG similarly shrank into its ethnic enclave and never managed to shake off its image as a platform “to safeguard Yoruba interests”. Like the NCNC in ‘59, it also campaigned outside its region and won seats through alliances with minor parties: United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC) in the North and Dynamic party in the East (both of which were formed to protect and advance the interests of ethnic minorities in those regions).

Having won the least amount of seats (among the big three) (See Table 1), and having similarly performed the poorest in its ethnic enclave (it only won 53% of the seats in the Western Region, as opposed to the NPC which won 77% of Northern seats, and NCNC won 79% of Eastern seats), the AG thus went into opposition upon independence. Awolowo, the party chairman, became the official leader of the opposition in the federal parliament. Awolowo’s decision to sit in the federal parliament in Lagos made him the only party chairman who “opted to go to the [federal] centre” and leave his party deputy, Ladoke Akintola, to become the Regional Premier. This decision however was to cost Awolowo as it left him “particularly vulnerable” to a leadership challenge from his deputy. 

The decision of both southern parties to step out of their ethnic enclaves to field candidates in all the federal regions during the ’59 election reflected their nationalist aspirations that the nation would be an open constituency for all parties to compete in. It was however also a reflection of political reality. Because of the sharp disparity in parliamentary seat allocation, “only the NPC could dominate the federation from its regional base alone”. An advantage neither of the other two parties enjoyed. Consequently, even as the ethnicization of politics strongly anchored the AG and the NCNC to their regions, the asymmetry of parliamentary power necessarily forced them to reach out to other minorities beyond their regions.


3.       The political alignment which formed after the 1959 election


In many ways the political constellation which emerged after the election of ’59 was the most potent of the structural weaknesses which formed the backdrop for the crises which later convulsed the young Republic. It had huge impacts on the stability of the soon to be independent nation. In the first instance, the North-South governing coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, variously described as “unnatural” and a coalition of “strange bedfellows” by historians of this era, only accentuated the Republic’s structural imbalances. On immediate observations, it was certainly a partnership of unequals – with the NPC being by far the more powerful of the two governing parties. This meant the NCNC always felt that its grip of the reins of the government, and by extension its ability to balance against the NPC, was tenuous. Further aggravating the latent tension was the fact that politicians from either party viewed members from the other side with suspicion, condescension, and even hostility. This was a microcosm of the North-South cleavage within Nigerian society just after independence whereby Yorubas and Igbos “sincerely saw the North as feudal and backward, a brake upon nationalist progress”. And the Hausa-Fulanis “sincerely perceived the prospect of Southern domination as a threat to [their] ... cultural values” which was strongly anchored in Islam. The deep ideological and cultural gulf between the two parties therefore led to a governing coalition that was wracked by “tension and mistrust” such that when multiple crises came, the governing alliance repeatedly broke down under the strains.

The political misfortunes of the AG after the ‘59 election would be another source of structural tension destabilising the First Republic. Political competition in Nigeria is usually interpreted through the prism of a zero-sum contest, with the ‘winners’ taking all and the ‘losers’ being starved of patronage and resources. The Politics of the First Republic was no different. Defeat in the election left the AG “stranded in opposition…without a firm base of power resources” – and by extension, it also meant that Yoruba elites lost their bargaining power over the distribution of federal patronage. To illustrate this point: Eghosa Osaghae, in his tour d'horizon of Nigeria's political history since Independence, states that part of the “bargain” which the NCNC secured upon joining government was “enhanced entry and promotion for Easterners in the public service and [the] armed forces”. ‘Relegation’ to the status of opposition and loss of access to patronage would eventually split the AG into two camps. The disintegration of the AG into factions, and the intra-Yoruba elite conflict which caused it, was to be the first crisis which shook the Republic early in its life – accentuating all its structural tensions, as we will see in the second section.


4.       The fear of ethnic domination


The last, and in many ways deepest of the structural weaknesses, was the fear of ethnic domination which pervaded the national politics of the First Republic. The Yorubas and Igbos in the two Southern Regions feared that the Hausa-Fulanis would utilize the North’s demographic preponderance to perpetuate northern hegemony, and monopolise federal resources for their ethnic constituency; and the Hausa-Fulanis in turn feared that in an open contest, the Yorubas and Igbos, having a more educated populace, would dominate the political and economic structures of the federation. Similarly within the South, the powerful undercurrent of tribalism placed the Yoruba and Igbo elites on a collision course as each feared that the other sought supremacy within the wider Southern region. And within the three regions, minority ethnic groups lived under the suffocating embrace of the three dominant groups. These fears and tensions were ruthlessly instrumentalized by ethnic elites in their quest to capture and consolidate their grip over political and economic power – fatally jeopardising national unity.

Thus, upon independence in 1960, Nigeria had a tense, fractured and conflictual socio-political landscape which resembled what some have characterised as a “three-player ethnic game”. This ethnically charged political competition shaped the contests for power across the two levels of the Republic. At the Federal level, the tripodal ethno-regional balance produced an intense three-way struggle for Federal power as elites from the dominant ethnic groups sought to acquire Federal patronage and resources on behalf of their ethnic constituencies. And at the Regional level, concluding that regional dominance maximises the resources a party can extract from the centre, the ethnic elites thus sought for their political parties a position of unrivalled primacy in their respective regions.

As Falola and Oyebade eloquently put it:

Party politics in [the First Republic], thus, necessarily focused on achieving narrow regional and ethnic political security, and not national interest. In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antagonism, regional politics inevitably led to destructive power struggles among the dominant ethnic parties to gain control of federal power for their respective regions. Given this political dynamic, Nigeria drifted from one crisis to another, compromising national stability, unity and development.

The Fall of the First Republic: Five Crises the led to Collapse


Having sketched out the structural features which shaped the First Republic’s political terrain, this second section will now examine how the elite struggles for power intersected with and exacerbated the structural triggers across five crises.


1.       The disintegration of the AG, 1962-63


The collapse of the AG’s political power was drawn-out, but its effects were immediate and far-reaching. The crisis which would engulf the party stemmed from its “staggering defeat” in the 1959 election. It had been ‘relegated’ to the opposition. The NCNC had made massive inroads into its regional heartland; securing for itself 21 seats in the AG’s political turf (See Table 1) by exploiting minority discontent within the Western Region. And most damagingly for Awolowo’s leadership of the party, leading Yoruba personalities interpreted the AG’s opposition role as a defeat for their ethnic group.

Under the crushing weight of disappointment, it didn’t take long for the party to fracture. Throughout 1960 and 1961, a simmering tension developed between Awolowo and his deputy, Akintola – who was also the Western Regional Premier. The first source of tension was over the ideological orientation of the party. Defeat in the election had led Awolowo to conclude that the AG could revive its fortunes and broaden its support base by sharpening its socialist rhetoric, radicalising its message and attacking frontally social inequalities. Awolowo reasoned that such an ideologically radical posture would enable the party to break out of its regional box and draw cross-ethnic support from workers and the underprivileged across the country. This placed him at odds with Akintola and many of the party elites who were regionalist in outlook and status-quo oriented. It also placed him at odds with the “Yoruba businessmen and merchants at the party’s financial core” who were worried that Awolowo wanted to transform the AG into a full-fledged communist party.

Disputes over party strategy further placed Awolowo and Akintola at loggerheads. Awolowo and his faction argued that only a strategy of direct confrontation with the NPC in parliament, and of luring the NCNC into a “progressive coalition” of Southern political forces, could act as a brake on Northern power, and secure for Yoruba elites a place at the Federal table. Akintola and his faction, on the other hand, countered that moderation toward the NPC - being the dominant party in government - was the best strategy for Yorubas to gain access to the “privileges and benefits in the federation”. Aggravating the emerging party and elite split was the clash over regional and party control between Awolowo, who sought to micro-manage the Western Region from the Federal centre; and Akintola, who wished to strike out on his own – now that he was Regional Premier – and emerge from under the shadow of his party boss. Akintola was said to have bitterly complained about Awolowo’s “insatiable desire to run the government of which I am head from outside”. Awolowo’s precarious position at the centre – cut off from control of regional patronage, and with no access to federal patronage to keep party chieftains loyal to him – meant if he was to retain control of the party and his influence in the region, he had to limit Akintola’s ability to build up his own independent networks of power which Akintola could then use to “wrest control of the party” from him.

In 1962, the festering tension finally erupted at the party congress in February as Awolowo moved to reassert his dominance in the AG. He orchestrated a series of motions which led to “critical changes” in the running of the party. For example, the party constitution was amended to weaken the Regional Premier’s (Akintola) role, and strengthen the party President’s (Awolowo) role in the key decision making body, the “Federal Executive Committee” (FEC). In addition, Awolowo’s allies “scored a clean sweep of the elections for major party offices”. As Akintola licked his wounds, having emerged from the party congress with his pride and power dented, Awolowo moved in for the kill – sensing the opportunity ripe to remove his weakened rival from office. In May, just three months after the party congress, Awolowo incited the party into deposing Akintola as Premier and party deputy. Unsurprisingly Akintola refused to go down quietly and challenged the constitutionality of his removal in court. He also mobilised his faction, “vowing a fight to the finish”.

By now the disintegrating AG, and the deepening split in Yoruba elite cohesion, was clearly becoming a “threat to peace and order in the West”. Violent riots erupted throughout the region as the power struggle between the two men and their elite factions spilled out into the streets. The NPC and NCNC watched the deepening fragmentation of their Western rival with cautious optimism; believing that the intra-party conflict would open up the West – allowing them to extend their power into the region. Ahmadu Bello, the NPC party chairman and Premier of the North went as far as issuing a public statement of support for Akintola as he battled to hold on to his position in the Party and the Region. Awolowo’s sharp attacks against political corruption and ministerial extravagance, which were increasingly drawing youths, radicals, and workers towards his cause, had also given the ruling coalition sufficient cause for concern.

The struggle between the two factions reached its climax in the regional parliament on the 25th of May when the Awolowo faction attempted to vote in a new Regional Premier, Alhaji Adegbenro. The parliamentary procedure descended into physical violence. Calculating that in any vote they would lose as they were in the minority, parliamentarians from the Akintola faction – supported by NCNC members of the Western regional assembly – resorted to violent disruption to block Adegbenro from being sworn in. John Mackintosh, a British political scientist then lecturing at the University of Ibadan, described the scene in parliament:

The House of Assembly met at 9 a.m. and after prayers, as Chief Odebiyi rose to move the first motion, Mr E. O. Oke, a supporter of Chief Akintola, jumped on the table shouting ‘There is fire on the mountain’. He proceeded to fling chairs about the chamber. Mr E. Ebubedike, also a supporter of Chief Akintola, seized the mace, attempted to club the speaker with it but missed and broke the mace on the table. The supporters of Alhaji Adegbenro sat quiet as they had been instructed to do, with the exception of one member who was hit with a chair and retaliated. Mr Akinyemi (NCNC) and Messrs Adigun and Adeniya (pro-Akintola) continued to throw chairs, the opposition joined in and there was such disorder that the Nigerian police released tear gas and cleared the House.

The Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa, gave an even more graphic account of events:

The whole House was shattered, every bit of furniture there was broken … some persons were stabbed.

Twice the Awolowo faction tried to convene the Regional Assembly, twice the Akintola faction violently disrupted the session, and twice necessitating the police to clear the Regional parliament with tear gas. The parliamentary brawls finally drew the two governing parties directly into the fray. Lured by the opportunity to destroy the AG and win the West for themselves; the NPC and NCNC wasted no time in capitalising on the chaos. Using their control of the federal government, they imposed a six-month state of emergency in the region on the 29th of May, suspended the AG led regional government, dismissed the Regional Assembly, and installed an Administrator to rule with sweeping powers. As the AG reeled from this assault, the two governing parties drove the knife deeper, instituting a commission of inquiry in June – “the Coker Commission” – to look into allegations of misuse of public funds in the Western Region. The Commission found Awolowo guilty of embezzling millions in cash and over-draft from government companies and parastatals, and of “trying to build a financial empire through abuse of his official position”.

Such was the drain on regional funds by Awolowo and AG party stalwarts that by 1962 the Western Region Marketing Board (WRMB) – the Marketing Boards were supposed to be one of the main instruments of development in the Regions; and the WRMB was the wealthiest of the three regional marketing boards[65] – “had to borrow to perform its own routine operations”.

While there was “little surprise or shock among AG supporters” at the extent of the fraud uncovered, and while few doubted Awolowo’s pivotal role in the scandal, many however felt that the findings of the Commission were selective and driven by a political agenda. For a start, its complete exoneration of Akintola from any of the financial crimes struck many as absurd as he was not only the party deputy, but also the Regional Premier while the region’s funds were being siphoned off to fund party activities[68]. Also most observers felt that had a similar investigation been done over the finances in the other two regions, the same level of gross abuse of public funds would have been uncovered.

With Coker Commission’s revelations inflicting damaging blows on Awolowo and the AG’s prestige; the Emergency Administrator’s restrictions on the freedom of movement of AG members were gradually relaxed for Akintola’s supporters, while that for Awolowo’s were tightened. This allowed Akintola to regroup his supporters – thus setting the stage for his eventual return as Premier. Under the unrelenting pressure, many Awolowo supporters defected to Akintola’s side in a bid to save their political careers. As the political pressure on Awolowo and his group escalated, and as indications multiplied that Akintola, now backed by the full might of the federal government, would be imposed as Regional Premier without a re-election after the Emergency period expired; some Awolowo supporters began secretly plotting to overthrow the federal government. The plot however was uncovered by a police informant, giving the NPC and NCNC more incentive to intensify their pressure on the AG and the Awolowo faction.

In September, the Prime Minister “revealed to a stunned nation” the plot to change the government through unconstitutional means. In November, Awolowo and the decimated leadership of the AG – now languishing in prison – were charged with “treasonable felony” and “conspiracy to stage a coup d’état”. And in December, as the Awolowo faction shrivelled under the storm, the government announced that it would no longer recognise the party as the official opposition; thus removing one more obstacle blocking the NPC and NCNC as they strove to obliterate their Western foe from the political arena.

1963 brought no respite for the rapidly collapsing AG. On the 1st of January, to the surprise of few, Akintola was re-installed as Regional Premier without an election. An election would have revived the flagging fortunes of the AG as Alhaji Adgbenro, the party candidate, would almost certainly have won. Something neither of the two governing parties wanted. Akintola’s return was only made possible by his alliance with one of the governing duo, the NCNC. In return, Akintola rewarded his Eastern ally with a “generous share of power in the West”, resulting in the NCNC scooping up numerous regional ministerial portfolios. More seriously for the Yorubas, particularly in view of the ethno-regional balance-of-power, Akintola was forced, as part of the bargain, to accept the partition of the West. This would eventually lead to the creation in August of a new region, the Mid-West (See Fig. 2), for the minorities of the West. This meant there were now four Federal Regions, though the ethno-regional balance still remained tripolar in character as the Mid-West quickly fell under the control of the East; an NCNC member became its Regional Premier. The NCNC had repeatedly tried to break up the Western Region in the past, but had failed to pull it off in parliament when the AG was then strong enough to act as an effective bargainer for Yoruba interests. But with Akintola’s hold on the West tenuous at best, he had no choice but to accept the partition as a fait accompli.



Figure 2: Nigeria's four federal regions, with the Mid-West which was created in August 1963. The figures inserted are their populations based on the 1963 census which was published in February 1964. SOURCE: Map: Wikipedia; Population: Osaghae, Crippled Giant, p. 141. Note: The figure for the Western region does not include Lagos’ population which was 665,000. TOTAL POPULATION including Lagos: 55,665,000.

While the governing duo of the NPC and NCNC presented the partition as a benevolent act to free victimised minorities in the West from Yoruba domination – and the act was certainly popular with the Western minorities who resoundingly voted, by over 90%, for the creation of the new Region in a referendum – no one doubted the political undertones which influenced the act. NCNC chieftains knew they were “all but certain to control” the new Mid-Western Region as their party’s penetration of the West in 1959 was made possible by winning minority votes in that area. They also calculated that with their “foothold in the Western regional government”, and with a new region entirely under their control, they could now be able to mount a “formidable challenge to the NPC” at the federal centre.

And certainly all the regions had their minority troubles. In the East for example, the Ibibios, Efiks and Ijaws, to name but a few, all harboured separatist sentiments against their domineering Igbo overlords. And in the North where “escalating political repression” twice plunged the region’s Tiv areas into open rebellion, in 1960 and 1964.

After the partition, and with its destruction nearing completion, two events finally finished off the AG as a credible force on the national political landscape. The formal publication of the Coker Commission report in January 1963 gave the government and Akintola the legal cover they needed to confiscate the assets of the AG, and break up its “commercial [and] financial” networks – steps which did “real damage” to the party. And on the 11th of September, Awolowo and his co-conspirators were finally found guilty of the treasonable felony charge and sentenced to 10 years in prison – this effectively wiped out the top echelons of the AG.

As Diamond, states in his Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria:

The breadth and magnitude of the defeat inflicted upon Chief Awolowo and his AG supporters by the NPC and the NCNC was simply staggering. Not only did the Awolowo Action Group lose the power struggle in the West, it was also…destroyed…as an effective opposition force.

The collapas of the AG immediately led to realignments in the political constellation. With his regional rival in jail and his grip over the West stabilized, Akintola shook off his alliance with the NCNC, dismissed their members from the regional cabinet, formed a new party – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) – and realigned it with the NPC. This was arguably where he had always wanted to be, as close as possible to Federal power. He probably calculated that under the nourishing embrace of the dominant party in government, he could rebuild the shattered position of the West and restore the Yorubas to parity in the ethno-regional balance.
   
But more fundamentally, the collapse of one pole (the AG) transformed the contest from a tripolar struggle to a bipolar one. With the disappearance of the AG as a national political force, the two governing parties now faced each other in direct and increasingly acrimonious confrontations. Like the breaking of the ground after an earthquake, deep fissures opened up between the NPC and the NCNC.

As the dust settled from the crisis, it became manifestly clear that the NPC had reaped the biggest windfall. With a dependent ally in Akintola’s NNDP now in control of the Western region, the Southern dream of an East-West ‘progressive alliance’ against Northern hegemony seemed all but broken. And with 16 independent parliamentarians having earlier in 1961 joined the NPC, their party now had a slim working majority in parliament. 

These developments meant the NCNC effectively lost its leverage over the federal centre, and therefore its “extractive capacity” – denting its power and confidence. The fear of ethnic domination penetrated into the East as the NPC strengthened its grip on the Federal Government. Indeed, the Eastern Regional Premier, Michael Okpara, recognising that the emerging political balance would be unfavourable to the East, had tried to “draw back” from the “total extinction” of the AG[95]. And Maitama Sule, an NPC Federal Minister, commenting on the changes taking place,confidently boasted: “In a very short time, the NPC will rule the whole of Nigeria”.

It was against this background that the Republic’s next crisis played out.


2.       Census Crisis, 1962-64


In May 1962, as the AG crisis was reaching its peak, the nation prepared for its first census as an independent country. The last census, which had been conducted in 1952-53 under the auspices of the British, had been the basis for the distribution of parliamentary seats prior to the 1959 election. Northern power, and the NPC’s dominance, largely resulted from this census (See Fig. 1, Chart 1 & Chart 2). Consequently, when a new census became due in 1962, implications for the ethno-regional balance-of-power inevitably shaped its meaning.

Yoruba and Igbo elites, in particular, viewed the census as an opportunity to change the unfavourable balance-of-power by reducing the demographic gap between the North and the South. They reasoned that if the population count could be turned in favour of the South, power relations between the three regions would equalize, and the “basis of Northern domination would be permanently removed”. The census would also determine the revenue allocation formula going forward, and the quota for recruitment into the Armed Forces and the Federal Civil Service. Given such stakes, and given the tragic failure of the political elites to take into account national stability and development as they jockeyed for power, it wasn’t surprising that the census generated an atmosphere of “feverish competition” as ethnic champions mobilised their constituencies for the coming contest. In the South, for example, Diamond states that:

Politicians were touring their constituencies urging the people ‘not to be left out’. It was suggested that besides the distribution of seats, amenities and scholarships would be shared on a popular basis, so…there was every advantage in obtaining ‘a good result’. Politicians and ethnic-group leaders were ‘out to win’ and ‘their campaign was only too successful’[100].

Expectations for a good result in the South were also heightened by the fact that many Southerners believed that the 1952-53 census, which had been conducted by the colonial authorities, were “grossly inaccurate…and deliberately falsified by the British to ensure Northern dominance”. There remains a widespread belief that British colonial officers were “naturally inclined towards the North” as many of them had previously served in Sudan before transferring to Nigeria, and therefore had “a romantic passion for Islam and for polo-playing aristocrats”. Underscoring the South’s positive expectations was also the belief that with generally better health care than the North, and a more “rapid decline in infant mortality”, the Southern Regions combined could expect better population numbers.

The counting of the census took place over two weeks in early May 1962. As the figures came in, it became immediately evident that some implausible increases had occurred between the last census and this. While the North’s increase of about 33% broadly tallied with the UN’s demographic projections, the East and West had scored staggering increases of 72% and 70% respectively. Some areas in the Eastern Region, for example, were posting increases of between 120% and 200%. With such astounding increases, it was either the Southern Regions had broken all known records of human reproduction, or else “statistical surgery” had taken place[106]. Unsurprisingly, the chief census officer opted for the latter explanation. Commenting on the particularly unbelievable figures coming in from the Eastern Region, he stated:

In the five Eastern divisions which had shown increases of over 120 per cent in ten years, several checks could be applied … [Most] telling, the biggest increase was in children under the age of five, and calculations showed that the women of child-bearing age could not have produced this number of births had they all been pregnant for all of the five previous years.

The report of the chief census officer submitted to government confirmed the massive population inflation that had attended the process and proposed verifications be carried out in certain areas as a way to rescue the credibility of the census. As the government prepared for the verification checks, it imposed a veil of secrecy on the fraudulent census result to quell potential riots over the new figures

Casting aside the veil of secrecy, Michael Okpara announced that the Easter Region now had 12.4 million people as per the census, and insisted that his Regional government would be sticking to this figure regardless of the conclusions of any verification exercise. Verification checks and recounts went ahead nonetheless, and Northern leaders promptly restored the balance by "discovering" an extra 8.5 million Northerners that had been “missed” in the initial count. This brought the North’s population to a new total of 31 million, up from the 22.5 million in the initial count - comfortably large enough to maintain its preponderant advantage.

Unsurprisingly, the NCNC led the South in completely rejecting the results of the verification exercise. The governing alliance broke down as the NCNC pushed for the release of the original census result, while the NPC backed the authenticity of the verification checks. Both sides flung insults and accusations toward the other. Given this impasse, the 1962 results were cancelled and a fresh census was announced for the second half of 1963.

The 1963 census turned out to be an even greater debacle. The political stakes attached to this new census were even more pronounced. With the 1964 general election just under a year away, and with the heightened insecurity felt in the Southern Regions over the NPC’s growing power, ethnic political security replaced any semblance of national unity. In the Eastern and Western Regions, ethnic champions once more mobilised their constituencies to deliver a good result. Restraints from the first time round were abandoned and numbers were simply conjured out of thin air. And in the North, having been late comers to the inflation game the first time round, ethnic elites there were determined not to be caught napping in the 1963 rerun. Eastern inspectors on their way to verify Northern numbers, for example, reportedly had their trains derailed[112]. Livestock were apparently counted in some places as part of the human population[113]. And “travellers and passers-by” were counted as part of the settled population[114]. Double and triple counting took place in all the four regions (by now the Mid-Western Region had been created).

Once again the government refused to immediately release the results of the 1963 census amidst bitter recriminations that each had massively inflated their numbers. While the official figures for the ‘63 census were never released, reports quickly circulated however that the figures had totalled up to an incredible 60.5 million – meaning an extra 15 million Nigerians had been added unto the total of the notoriously inflated 1962 census. While publically the government pleaded for time so it could carry out “exhaustive tests” on the data it had received, privately ethnic elites from all the regions were engaged in hard bargaining to secure the best numbers for their constituencies.

On the 24th of February 1964, the result of the compromise was announced: there were to be 55.6 million Nigerians – 10 million larger than the notorious figures of 1962.  The East kept its 12.4 million figures from the 1962 count; the North reduced the 8.5 million Northerners it had discovered to 7.3 million, bringing its total population to 29.8 million; the West added an extra 2.5 million to its 1962 figures, bringing its population to 10.3 million; and the Mid-West was allowed to pad up its numbers by 300,000, to bring its population to 2.5 million; and a population of 665,000 was counted for Lagos. The North had kept its comfortable demographic preponderance (See Fig. 2 & Chart 3).




Not even this compromise was enough to calm frayed nerves as tensions erupted once more within the governing alliance. The NCNC accused the NPC of unilaterally releasing the figures before consultations were finished and final agreements reached. Consequently, Michael Okpara in the East rejected the February 1964 figures as “worse than useless”.  And Dennis Osadebay, the Premier in the Mid-West and an NCNC member, echoing his Eastern ally, similarly condemned the figures as “the most stupendous joke of our age”. Akintola in the West, being dependent on the NPC for his position as Regional Premier accepted the results. As the NCNC maneuvered to get the 1963 results cancelled; the NPC, using its control of the Federal Government, forced Osadebay into abandoning his Eastern ally and toeing the government line by threatening the Mid-West with the withdrawal of federal aid – a move which would have financially crippled the new region.With the NCNC consensus broken and the Eastern Region isolated, Michael Okpara too was eventually forced to accept the new figures. The imbalance of power was now more acute than ever before.

As the nation breathed a sigh of relief at having survived another crisis which had severely strained the unity and stability of the Republic, all attention focused on the next big event less than 10 months away: the 1964 general election. Southern elites looked to the election as the one last chance to break the NPC’s tightening grip on power. Among Northern elites however, there was the general expectation that the election would reproduce their Federal dominance. As the parliamentary secretary of the Northern House of Assembly, Alhaji Kokori Abdul, said just a couple of months before the election:

I have no doubt whatever (sic) … that the Northern People’s Congress has come to stay and to continue to stay and is going to rule Nigeria forever.

With the reverberations from the previous two crises deepening the cracks within the system, it should have been evident to the nation’s elites that the First Republic could not withstand another political crisis. And sure enough, the upheavals unleashed with the 1964 and 1965 would eventually lead to the Republic’s catastrophic end in 1966.

The Sunset Years, 1964-The Fall

  1. 3.       The General Strike, June 1-13 1964


To all intents and purposes, by 1964, the Republic stood at a critical juncture in its political life. Its birth pangs had been accompanied by political instability as the nation’s elites jockeyed for State power. With the census crisis finally winding down in the beginning of the year, all energies were soon concentrated on the forthcoming general election to be held on the 30th of December. While the collapse of the AG as a national political force had opened up deep cracks within the ruling coalition, the long running census crisis had progressively hardened the dividing line between the NPC and the NCNC. The general strike would finally shatter the fragile governing alliance.

On the 1st of June, after about a year of brinkmanship between the government and state employees over the issue of a living wage for workers, the country’s labour unions united under the banner of a Joint Action Committee (JAC) and declared a general strike. For thirteen days, economic activity was paralysed and “essential services [brought] to a virtual standstill” as about 750,000 of the nation’s estimated one million wage labourers downed tools and refused to work. Of the 750,000 strikers, only about 300,000 were part of the labour unions that had called the strike; an indication of the strike’s mass support.

After a week of protests and strike action, the government entered into talks with the JAC. On the 9th of June however, the talks broke down in stalemate. In defiance the JAC demanded the Prime Minister return to the negotiating table or “resign within 48 hours”. NCNC leaders, calculating that the tidal wave of discontent unleashed by the strike action could be turned into an electoral advantage against the NPC, abandoned the government line and openly sided with the striking workers. The NCNC’s open support of the JAC all but permanently broke the governing alliance.

With the strikers gaining in confidence and expanding their support base, and with the dangers of a social revolution becoming more real, the government (by this time it was effectively the NPC alone) finally buckled under the pressure and gave into the demands for salary increases on the 13th – bringing to an end the 13 day strike. As an indication of how volatile the situation had become, Howard Wolpe, in his Urban Politics in Nigeria, advances the argument that – aside from the desertion of the NCNC and the growing dangers of a wider social revolt – another factor which also forced the NPC into caving was the threat of a “local police uprising in Lagos” in support of the striking workers.

On the surface, the strike was the result of workers’ demand for a new minimum wage in the private and public sectors which would have guaranteed a reasonable standard of living for workers. On a deeper level however, it was also a reflection of the undercurrent of dissatisfaction and discontent within the wider populace against corruption, widening economic inequality, and the seeming failure of the political elites to deliver the dividends of independence. In their quest for power and status, the nation’s leaders had transformed the State into the guarantor of instant wealth. Control of the apparatuses of State power thus took on a life and death struggle, to the detriment of development and modernization.

By 1964, endemic corruption, ministerial profligacy, and the corrosive effects of ethnic politics had seriously eroded the First Republic’s legitimacy. The “spreading virus of corruption and the enormous salaries at the bloated higher ranks of government” placed great strains on any “domestic capital that could be mobilised” for investment. In fact it got to a stage when the government swelled to a staggering eighty ministers. Bribes for government contract were rampant. The privileged flaunted their illegally acquired wealth – crystallising the general sense of moral decay and social injustice.

No one exemplified the First Republic's problem with endemic corruption more than the Finance minister himself, Festus Okotie-Eboh. Such was his notoriety that a foreign official gave this witheringly unflattering portrait of him:

Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was a fat, jovial character … [whose] name had become synonymous with corruption in Lagos… [He] was a squalid crook who dragged Nigeria down to his level… He dragged Nigeria into the sewer, but because of his corruption Nigeria has no sewers.  The money to pay for them is still in Swiss banks.

Diamond, in his penetrating assessment of the general strike, commented that:

More than just a strike by the nation's workers for higher wages … it was a sweeping challenge to the entire political class and its ruling authority … [and] … over the entire structure of inequality in Nigerian society. Union leaders fixed their protest … on the glaring levels of corruption and extravagant consumption by the nation's political elite. It was this larger issue that rallied the broad-based and spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the strike in most Nigerian cities[134].

  1. 4.       The General Election, December 1964


While the mass popular appeal of the strike seemed to foreshadow a new dividing line hardening along class lines; a deeper, more fundamental, cleavage reasserted itself. Out on the campaign trail, the elites, to lock in their vote share, amplified their appeals to ethnic identity in ways that strained the fragile national bond. 

In the Western Region for example, Akintola constantly stoked fears of Igbo domination to shore up the sagging support of his unpopular party - the NNDP. With Yoruba elites stuck in the wilderness of opposition, he argued, Igbo leaders had used their access to federal patronage to muscle their ethnic kinsmen into senior government posts to the detriment of the Yoruba nation. As he put it:

Notwithstanding our wealth and high social advancement, Western Nigeria has become a mere appendage in the community of the Federal Republic of Nigeria … and as a result they have been superseded by relatives, tribesmen and clansmen of the eastern NCNC chairman, who shout the slogan of one Nigeria more than anyone else[138].

Igbo leaders responded by calling on their ethnic kin to “rally to the defense of their embattled people” by voting for the NCNC. While AG leaders, not to be outdone by their rivals, moved to lock in Northern minority votes by promising to “end … Hausa-Fulani domination”.

The political environment was made more volatile by the shift in party alignments taking place. The NPC-NCNC confrontations over the previous years, and the final collapse of the governing coalition after the June general strike, exerted a powerful gravitational pull on the political space. This led to the emergence of two opposing alliances for the coming elections: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) led by the NPC, and comprising Akintola’s NNDP and other minority parties from the South. And the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) led by the NCNC, and comprising the AG (with Awolowo in jail, it was now led by Alhaji Adegbenro), and other radical and ethnic minority parties from the North.

Despite this seemingly national coalition, the two opposing alliances essentially represented a “North-South constellation of forces”. The pivotal core of the NNA was the NPC. Its alliance with ethnic minority parties beyond its region stemmed from the realisation on the part of the Hausa-Fulani elites that though hegemony in the Northern Region could deliver the Nigerian State to them, extending their power into the Southern regions by proxy would allow them to better consolidate their dominance of the political space. Similarly while central pillar of the UPGA was the NCNC, the acute fear of growing Hausa-Fulani power among Igbo elites underpinned the party’s strategy of reaching out to minorities and radicals in the Northern region. For UPGA party bosses, this was seen as a matter of ethnic political security. Simple arithmetic dictated that only by penetrating the North could they hope to, at the very least, block the NPC from gaining full control of the state.

Adding an extra layer of complexity and tension was the breakdown in Yoruba elite cohesion; a ripple effect of the Awolowo-Akintola power struggle. The shattered remnants of AG, now led by Alhaji Adegbenro, saw the election as a chance to re-establish the party’s control of the Western region. The party, like most Yorubas, amongst whom it was still very popular, also concluded that full Northern control of the Nigeria was dangerous to the interests of the Yoruba nation; hence its decision to join the UPGA coalition. The NNDP on the other hand, owing to its dependence on the NPC for its rule in the Western Region, and owing to Akintola’s long held belief that only an alliance with the politically powerful Hausa-Fulanis could secure the long term interests of the Yorubas, unsurprisingly joined the NNA coalition. Akintola also saw the election as a chance to finish off the AG once and for all, and establish his hegemony in the Western Region.

The electoral campaigns of both coalitions were marked by violence and strong-arm tactics. Thugs were freely recruited to intimidate opposition supporters. Political opponents were beaten up. The NPC especially, fully used its incumbency advantage – jailing opposition candidates or supporters for the slightest infractions. In strategic areas where the probability of defeat was too high, both coalitions sometimes resorted to the “physical elimination of opposition candidates”. 

The desperate appeal of the Inspector General of the Police to the supporters of the contending parties illustrates the thuggery and hooliganism which characterised the run-up to the election:

Don’t arm yourselves with broken bottles, hatchets, sticks… Do not set fire to the motor vehicles of your political opponents.

With the situation seemingly escalating beyond control as bands of thugs roamed the streets enforcing ‘party discipline’, there were the first “rumblings of a possible military coup” within the army. On the 10th of December, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Federal President, made a dramatic dawn broadcast warning that the unity of the nation was at risk:

I have only one request from our politicians … If this embryo Republic must disintegrate, then, in the name of God, let the operation be a short and painless one… And I have one advice to give our politicians: if they have decided to destroy our national unity, then they should summon a round-table conference to decide how our national assets should be divided before they seal their doom by satisfying their lust for office… It is better for us and for our many admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces[148].

Unfortunately, not even such a solemn intervention could stem the growing tide of violence and lawlessness. The Prime Minister (Tafawa Balewa), supported by the Northern and Western Premiers (Ahmadu Bello and Akintola respectively), dismissed the accusations of electoral malpractices as “unjust” and “groundless”. Given their party’s incumbency advantage at the federal level, they were supremely confident of out-rigging their UPGA rivals in the forthcoming election.

With the determination of the NNA to hold the election unswayed by unfolding events, half of the members of the Federal Election Commission resigned in protest. UPGA leaders, frustrated by their inability to match the NNA’s disruptive tactics, decided to boycott the election. It turned out to be an unwise decision.

The elections went ahead as scheduled on the 30th of December. The UPGA’s absence left the field wide open for NNA candidates to sweep all before them. In the Northern region, the NPC wan 162 seats of the 167 seats in that region (See Table 2 below). Should the results stand, the NPC could now govern the Federation alone (157 seats was what was needed to form a majority in the Federal Parliament). In the Eastern region, the NCNC was able to block any voting from taking place. While in the Western and Mid-Western regions, recognising it had seriously blundered, and alarmed at the prospect of being completely obliterated from the political map, UPGA leaders called off the boycott and sent out their candidates to contest. The call-off came too late to reverse the tide against the party. In the Western region in particular, the “electoral process was so abused” that though intensely unpopular, the NNDP won a scarcely believable 63% of the seats in that region (It won 36 seats out of 57 seats allocated to the region: See Table 2). UPGA leaders immediately rejected the results and called for new elections to be held.


PARTY
NORTHERN REGION
WESTERN REGION
EASTERN REGION
MID-WESTERN REGION
LAGOS (CAPITAL)
TOTAL SEATS WON
NPC
162
0
0
0
0
162 (52%)
NNDP
0
36
0
0
0
36 (11%)
NCNC
0
5
64
14
1
84 (27%)
AG
0
15
4
0
2
21 (7%)
OTHERS
5
1
2
0
1
9 (3%)
TOTAL SEATS ALLOCATED
167
57
70
14
4
Total Seats in Parliament: 312

Table 2: Distribution of seats won by the major parties after the 1964/65 General Elections. With the creation of the Mid-Western Region in 1963, seats were reallocated to it from the other Regions: 7 seats were taken from the Northern Region (it had 174 seats for the 1959 election); 5 seats from the Western Region (62 in 1959); 3 seats from the Eastern Region (73 in 1959). Those 15 seats were then divided as follows: 1 was given to Lagos, to bring its total to 4 seats; with the remaining 14 seats going to the Mid-West. 

With the NNA coalition having secured a historic ‘victory’ at the polls, Tafawa Balewa called on the President to reappoint him as Prime Minister. Sharply critical of the “conduct and outcome” of the election, Azikiwe refused; threatening to resign if the results were not scrapped and new elections called. For five days the First Republic “teetered on the edge of an abyss”, without a government, as both Azikiwe and Tafawa Balewa openly competed “for control and support of the armed forces”. Secessionist rhetoric grew louder, and the dangers of a Civil War loomed large.

With legal advice from the nation’s senior judges strongly indicating that in the event of conflicting orders the armed forces were legally obligated to obey the Prime Minister alone, and with rumours circulating that Prime Minister was planning to orchestrate his removal by “having him declared medically incapacitated”, the President finally relented on the 4th of January 1965. Under the so-called “Zik-Balewa pact”, Azikiwe agreed to invite Balewa to form a new government in return for which Balewa would (1) form a “broad-based government” with members of the opposition incorporated into the cabinet; (2) the boycotted elections in the Eastern Region would be rescheduled for March; and (3) elections be held for the Western Regional assembly in October to choose a new Premier for that Region.

The rescheduled election took place in the Eastern Region without incident. The NCNC, appealing to Igbo unity, easily secured 91% of the seats in that Region. As per the arrangement reached in the ‘Pact’, many newly elected NCNC members were absorbed into the government. Consequently the federal cabinet swelled to the “unprecedented size of eighty ministers”. Commenting on this development, Falola, in his The History of Nigeria, with biting sarcasm said: “The government had now been converted into a holding company with every ‘big politician’ becoming a shareholder”.


5.       The Western Regional Election and the final showdown, October 1965


The disaster of the 1964 election unfortunately failed to act as a salutary check on the “win-at-all costs mentality” of the nation’s elites.

The Western regional election was one of the main pillars of the Zik-Balewa Pact. The NCNC had insisted that an election be held to choose a new Premier in the region as a precondition for accepting the results of the 1964 election. They were confident that in a free and fair election, their Western ally, the AG, would be able to dislodge the NNDP from the region – with Alhaji Adegbenro replacing Akintola as the Premier. Those hopes were to be dashed. Akintola was certainly not ready to relinquish power without a bruising fight.  

Two factors combined to ensure that the fraud and violence which characterised the 1965 Western election would far surpass the general election in 1964. First was the fact that unlike the other three regions – the Northern, Eastern and Mid-Western – which were effectively “one-party states”; in the West, intra-elite conflict meant the two parties (AG and NNDP) representing the contending elite factions were “engaged in a deadly rivalry” for political survival. To quote Diamond:

If Chief Akintola's ruling party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), won a full five-year term, Action Group leaders knew it would continue to use regional power ruthlessly to extinguish their party. The Akintola forces, on the other hand, expected, in the case of defeat, to become the victims of their own methods, without a genuine base of popular support to sustain them.

The second factor was the fact that though the election was on the face of it a Western regional affair, the outcome was of “critical importance … to the game plans” of the Northern and Eastern Regions. A pliant ally in the West would allow the NPC to consolidate its hold on the State; while for the NCNC, a revived and strong AG, in alliance with it, would make the Southern regions sufficiently strong enough to counterbalance against the dangers of Northern hegemony.

Akintola, acutely aware that his fate as Regional Premier hinged on the outcome of the election, instrumentalized tribalism, with even greater intensity than 1964, as a tactic of political mobilisation. He beamed his searchlight on public institutions in the region were Igbos held senior positions and led the calls for their dismissal. One such institution was the University of Lagos, where the Vice Chancellor was forced out and replaced by a Yoruba man.  

However, knowing that the rhetoric of ethnic chauvinism on its own would not be sufficient to dent the AG’s chances of winning, Akintola also used his incumbency advantage to full effect: blocking AG candidates from campaigning and intimidating their supporters from holding rallies. There was no doubt within the NNDP camp that only “wholesale electoral fraud” could rescue them from humiliating defeat at the polls. Max Siollun, one of Nigeria's leading political historians, states that:

NNDP officials barely bothered to conceal their intentions, declaring in advance that they would ‘win’ the election even if people did not vote for them.

When the election itself came, very few were surprised by the riggings that took place. But what angered many, and undoubtedly contributed to the orgy of violence that followed the election, was the sheer brazenness and impunity with which the NNDP went about the business of rigging its members back to parliament. For example, rather than bother with the logistical inconvenience of inflating disagreeable figures that had been announced at polling stations, the NNDP simply had many of its newly ‘elected’ parliamentarians declared “unopposed” winners in radio stations.  

Disregarding the brazenly fraudulent results being announced on the radio, the AG announced itself as the true winner of the election and tried to swear Adegbenro as the Premier. Its supporters poured into the streets. The spasm of violence which engulfed the entire Western region was unprecedented. There was widespread destruction of life and property. Political thugs took to setting fire to persons (particularly NNDP supporters and Hausa-Fulani settlers) and properties in what they called Operation Wetie, which meant to “wet with petrol and burn”.

As the Western Region slid into anarchy, the Prime Minister refused to impose a state of Emergency on the region, as he had done in 1962 during the AG crisis – or at the very least call in the army to restore order. Some have since argued that Tafawa Balewa refused to declare a state of emergency because his party was allied to the NNDP, and therefore didn’t want to throw it out of power so soon after its ‘election’. And similarly his refusal to call in the army was based, Osaghae argues in his book, Crippled Giant, on the belief that many of the soldiers stationed in the region were sympathetic to the opposition.  

In any case, the 1965 October ‘election’, and the spasm of violence which accompanied it, turned out to be the last act in a tragic play. As Diamond argues:

If [the] various social elements had any faith left in the institutions of the First Republic, it was irrevocably shattered by the 1965 ‘election’ in the West, which seemed to obliterate any remaining vestige of the Republic’s democratic character.

On the 15th of January 1966, elements within the army, hoping to lead a military revolution, struck with lethal force, and wiped out the top tiers of the Republic. On the 16th of January, the head of the army took over as Head of State, formally bringing to an end the First Republic, and beginning Nigeria’s long and tragic romance with the ‘Men on horseback’. And by the 17th of January, when the last of the mutineers had surrendered to the new military government, the Prime Minister (Tafawa Balewa), Finance Minister (Okotie-Eboh), Premiers of the Northern (Ahmadu Bello) and Western (Akintola) Regions, and seven senior military officers had all been gunned down.




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